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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature Of The Case 
 
 Dan Ray Nelson appeals from his conviction for sexual battery of a child. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 
 The state charged Nelson with one count of lewd conduct with a child 
under the age of 16 and one count of sexual battery on a child age 16 or 17.  (R., 
pp. 32-33, 45-46.)  The victim in both counts was C.F.  (Id.) 
 The witnesses at trial included C.F. (Tr., p. 147, Ls. 17-20); Detective John 
Marley (Tr., p. 292, Ls. 15-25); and the defendant, Nelson (Tr., p. 400, Ls. 12-
19).  C.F. testified that for a period of over four years before he turned 18, Nelson 
repeatedly had C.F. touch Nelson’s penis or Nelson manually or orally touched 
C.F.’s penis.  (Tr., p. 155, L. 24 – p. 156, L. 16; p. 162, L. 1 – p. 180, L. 10; p. 
186, L. 15 – p. 214, L. 20.)  Detective Marley testified he interviewed Nelson.  
(Tr., p. 304, Ls. 3 – p. 304, L. 24.)  Nelson initially claimed he had no sexual 
contact with C.F., but later stated that on one occasion C.F. touched Nelson’s 
genitals without Nelson’s consent, and that on another occasion he was assisting 
then-17-year-old C.F. to trim his pubic hair when C.F. became erect and Nelson 
put C.F.’s penis in his mouth.  (Tr., p. 306, L. 12 – p. 324, L. 22.)  Detective 
Marley testified that he recorded the interview, but for unknown reasons only the 
video recorded, and not the audio.  (Tr., p. 327, L. 22 – p. 329, L. 16; State’s 
Exhibit 1.)   
Nelson testified at trial and denied telling Detective Marley that he had put 
his mouth on C.F.’s penis.  (Tr., p. 428, Ls. 4-20.)  Nelson testified that Detective 
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Marley was lying about him admitting to having taken C.F.’s penis in his mouth 
when he trimmed C.F.’s pubic hair.  (Tr., p. 452, L. 1 – p. 456, L. 4.) 
The prosecutor’s closing arguments included several themes, two of which 
are relevant to this appeal: that an inconsistency in the victim’s prior statements 
regarding the number of times he had been sexually touched by Nelson did not 
show his testimony to be unreliable (Tr., p. 488, L. 19 – p.  490, L. 2), and that 
Detective Marley did not fabricate Nelson’s confession to performing oral sex on 
C.F. when trimming C.F.’s pubic hair (Tr., p. 492, L. 1 – p. 495, L. 11).  Nelson 
objected to neither of these arguments at trial.  (Tr., p. 488, L. 19 – p.  490, L. 2; 
p. 492, L. 1 – p. 495, L. 11.) 
 The jury returned verdicts of not guilty of lewd conduct but guilty of sexual 
battery.  (R., p. 103.)  The district court imposed a sentence of 25 years with 
three years determinate.  (R., pp. 170-71.)  Nelson filed a timely appeal.  (R., pp. 
188-91.) 
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ISSUE 
 
 Nelson states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the State violate Mr. Nelson’s constitutional right to a fair trial by 
committing multiple acts of prosecutorial misconduct during closing 
argument? 
 
 (Appellant’s brief, p. 9.) 
 
 The state rephrases the issue as: 
 
 Has Nelson failed to identify any impropriety in the prosecutor’s final 
argument, much less demonstrate fundamental error? 
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ARGUMENT 
 
Nelson Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error In The Prosecutor’s Final 
Argument 
 
A. Introduction 
 
 For the first time on appeal, Nelson asserts the prosecutor made two 
incorrect arguments in closing by “vouching for the credibility of the investigating 
officer” and “appealing to the emotion, passion or prejudice of the jury.”  
(Appellant’s brief, p. 10.)  In neither instance has Nelson shown an improper 
argument, much less misconduct rising to the level of fundamental error.   
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 The “standard of review governing claims of prosecutorial misconduct 
depends on whether the defendant objected to the misconduct at trial.”  State v. 
Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 715, 215 P.3d 414, 435 (2009).  If a defendant fails to 
timely object at trial to allegedly improper closing arguments by the prosecutor, 
the conviction will be set aside for prosecutorial misconduct only upon a showing 
by the defendant that the alleged misconduct rises to the level of fundamental 
error.  State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 228, 245 P.3d 961, 980 (2010). Claims of 
fundamental error are reviewed using a three-part test: 
(1) the defendant must demonstrate that one or more of the 
defendant’s unwaived constitutional rights were violated; (2) the 
error must be clear or obvious, without the need for any additional 
information not contained in the appellate record, including 
information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical 
decision; and (3) the defendant must demonstrate that the error 
affected the defendant’s substantial rights, meaning (in most 
instances) that it must have affected the outcome of the trial 
proceedings. 
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Id. at 226, 245 P.3d at 978 (footnote omitted). 
 
C. Nelson Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error In The Prosecutor’s 
Arguments Regarding The Detective’s Credibility 
 
Prosecutors have considerable latitude in closing argument and have the 
right to discuss the evidence and the inferences and deductions arising from 
therefrom.  State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 280, 77 P.3d 956, 969 (2003).  The 
purpose of the prosecutor’s closing argument is to enlighten the jury and help the 
jurors remember and interpret the evidence.  State v. Reynolds, 120 Idaho 445, 
450, 816 P.2d 1002, 1007 (Ct. App. 1991).  In reviewing a claim of improper 
argument by a prosecutor “‘a court should not lightly infer that a prosecutor 
intends an ambiguous remark to have its most damaging meaning or that a jury, 
sitting through lengthy exhortation, will draw that meaning from the plethora of 
less damaging interpretations.’”  State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 719, 215 
P.3d 414, 439 (2009) (quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 647 
(1974)).  Likewise, arguments should be evaluated in light of defense conduct 
and the context of the entire trial.  Id. 
A prosecutor may "express an opinion in argument as to the truth or falsity 
of testimony . . . when such an opinion is based upon the evidence."  State v. 
Timmons, 145 Idaho 279, 288, 178 P.3d 644, 653 (Ct. App. 2007); see also State 
v. Priest, 128 Idaho 6, 14, 909 P.2d 624, 632 (Ct. App. 1996) (While a prosecutor 
may not “express a personal belief or opinion as to the truth or falsity of any 
testimony or evidence,” a prosecutor may “express how, from [the prosecutor’s] 
perspective, the evidence confirms or calls into doubt the credibility of particular 
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witnesses.”).  A prosecutor may also argue “that the state’s evidence and theory 
of the case [is] more convincing.”  State v. Gross, 146 Idaho 15, 20, 189 P.3d 
477, 482 (Ct. App. 2008).  A prosecutor’s opinions and argument do not 
constitute vouching unless the prosecutor interjects “personal belief” regarding 
the evidence or a witness’s credibility, Timmons, 145 Idaho at 289, 178 P.3d at 
654, or asks jurors “to make their decision based upon … the prosecutor’s self-
proclaimed moral rectitude and integrity rather than addressing the evidence,” 
Gross, 146 Idaho at 20, 189 P.3d at 482.  Review of the record shows that, 
rather than improper vouching, the prosecutor’s arguments were limited to the 
evidence in the record. 
In addressing Nelson’s claim that Detective Marley lied when he testified 
that Nelson admitted putting C.F.’s penis in his mouth, the prosecutor argued that 
either Detective Marley or Nelson had to be lying about what Nelson said in the 
interview.  (Tr., p. 493, Ls. 1-3.)  The prosecutor then said he intended to walk 
through the argument regarding who was lying, “a step at a time.”  (Tr., p. 493, 
Ls. 4-6.)  The prosecutor’s steps included that Detective Marley testified that 
Nelson, in the interview, had denied all other wrongdoing (arguing that a made-
up confession would have been more extensive and detailed); that Nelson’s sole 
confession to oral copulation came only after being confronted with the unlikely 
nature of his initial statements about trimming pubic hair; that even when denying 
wrongdoing Nelson’s statements often corroborated C.F.’s claims; and, finally, 
that Nelson’s gestures in the video (making cutting motions) were consistent with 
Detective Marley’s version but not Nelson’s version of what Nelson was saying at 
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that moment.  (Tr., p. 493, L. 12 – p. 495, L. 11.)  The prosecutor concluded that 
it was “ridiculous to suggest [Detective Marley’s] mistaken on that or he’s lying.”  
(Tr., p. 495, Ls. 9-10.) 
In the course of this argument, the prosecutor said two things that Nelson, 
for the first time on appeal, finds objectionable.  First, the prosecutor stated he 
was trying to walk through the steps of the argument “very objectively, because 
the absurdity to suggest that Detective Marley would lie about this makes my skin 
crawl.”  (Tr., p. 493, Ls. 6-8.)  Second, arguing that if Detective Marley was going 
to fabricate a confession he would have had Nelson confessing to everything, the 
prosecutor argued that “I can do a better job” and “we can do a better job” of 
making up a false confession than the true confession Detective Marley testified 
to.  (Tr., p. 494, L. 13 – p. 495, L. 1.)  Application of the correct legal principles to 
both of these arguments shows no error, much less fundamental error. 
1. The Prosecutor Properly Argued That The Claim Detective Marley 
Fabricated Nelson’s Confession Was Absurd 
 
The prosecutor’s statement that “the absurdity” of the claim that Detective 
Marley lied about Nelson’s admission made his “skin crawl” was not vouching for 
the detective.  The “skin crawl” comment was aimed at the “absurdity” of claiming 
the detective was lying, and was made in the context of an argument that the 
evidence showed the claim the detective was lying was “ridiculous.”  There is 
nothing in the argument made by the prosecutor—that the “absurdity” of the 
claim of lying made his “skin crawl”—suggesting it was based on anything other 
than the evidence. 
 8 
 
Nelson argues that by stating that the “absurdity” of the lying claim made 
his “skin crawl” the prosecutor was expressing personal belief as to the credibility 
of the detective.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 12-13.)  He does not articulate, however, 
how the argument was based on anything other than the evidence.  First, there is 
nothing in the statement itself—“I’m trying to do this very objectively, because the 
absurdity to suggest that Detective Marley would lie about this makes my skin 
crawl” (Tr., p. 493, Ls. 5-8)—suggesting it was based on anything outside the 
evidence presented.  Moreover, the statement was made in the context of an 
argument that the evidence (including evidence that Nelson made cutting 
motions while making the statement he claimed was not a confession to cutting 
C.F.’s pubic hair) made the claim “ridiculous.”  Neither the language of the 
statement itself nor the context in which it was made support any prong of 
Nelson’s claim of fundamental error. 
2. The Prosecutor Properly Argued That The Confession Was Not A 
Lie Because A Fabricated Confession Would Have Been More 
Incriminating  
 
In the course of arguing one of the steps for determining if the Detective 
was telling the truth or lying about Nelson’s confession, the prosecutor argued 
that a lie would have been fabricated “better” because a fabricated confession 
would have been more incriminating.  (Tr., p. 494, L. 18 – p. 495, L. 1.)  To 
emphasize the point, the prosecutor stated that “I” and “we” “can do a better job” 
of fabricating a false confession.  (Tr., p. 494, Ls. 18-21.)  This statement—that 
“I” and “we” could make up better false confessions—was a proper argument for 
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the jury to apply its common sense and experience in evaluating whether 
Detective Marley’s testimony regarding Nelson’s confession was a lie or the truth. 
On appeal Nelson challenges the prosecutor’s choice of pronouns, 
arguing that use of the word “we” put the prosecutor and detective “on the same 
team.”  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 14-15.)  First off, in context the “we” used by the 
prosecutor is apparently a reference to the prosecutor and the jurors being able 
to come up with a better lie than the detective allegedly did.  The prosecutor said, 
“I mean, if you want me to lie to you, we can do a better job” (Tr., p. 494, Ls. 18-
21 (emphasis added)), not “if you want us to lie to you, we can do a better job.”  
The prosecutor’s use of the word “we” did not convert a perfectly proper 
argument—that if the detective had fabricated a confession as claimed by Nelson 
he would have fabricated one more helpful to the state—into error, much less 
fundamental error. 
 
D. The Prosecutor’s Invitation To The Jury To “Imagine” Being In C.F.’s 
Circumstances When He Was Interviewed By A Forensic Examiner In 
Order To Evaluate His Credibility Was Not Improper Argument 
 
Appeals to the emotions, passions or prejudices of the jury through use of 
inflammatory tactics are impermissible.  State v. Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho 758, 
769, 864 P.2d 596, 607 (1993).  One such tactic is to improperly request the 
jurors to put themselves in the position of a party or victim.  State v. Gross, 146 
Idaho 15, 21, 189 P.3d 477, 483 (Ct. App. 2008) (improper to ask jurors to “step 
into the shoes of a hypothetical victim of [defendant’s] alleged drunk driving”).  
This type of improper argument is called a “golden rule” argument.  Lopez v. 
Langer, 114 Idaho 873, 878-79, 761 P.2d 1225, 1230-31 (1988).  However, 
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although a “golden rule” argument is improper when used to “encourage[] the jury 
to depart from neutrality,” it is “appropriate when used to ask the jury to assess 
the reasonableness of a party’s actions by relying on their own common sense 
and life experiences.”  Id.  See also State v. Long, 975 A.2d 660, 675-77 (Conn. 
2009) (argument to “look at” victim’s statements and actions “from the 
perspective of that fourteen year girl” not improper (emphasis omitted)). Review 
shows the prosecutor’s argument to “imagine” being an 18-year-old undergoing a 
forensic sex interview, made in relation to the victim’s credibility, was a proper 
argument based on the jury’s common sense and life experiences, and not a call 
to sympathize with the victim.  
   During cross examination, Nelson’s counsel questioned C.F. extensively 
about possible inconsistencies between his testimony and his statements to a 
forensic sex abuse examiner.  (Tr., p. 237, L. 10 – p. 238, L. 19; p. 250, L. 25 – p. 
253, L. 7; p. 253, L. 24 – p. 255, L. 17; p. 258, Ls. 12-21; p. 260, L. 19 – p. 261, 
L. 18; p. 261, L. 19 – p. 262, L. 10; p. 265, L. 8 – p. 266, L. 24.)  In closing, the 
prosecutor argued that the inconsistencies did not ultimately call C.F.’s testimony 
into question.  (Tr., p. 488, L. 19 – p. 490, L. 11.)  As part of that argument the 
prosecutor asked the jurors to “imagine going in” to the interview as an 18-year-
old male and revealing to a woman interviewer “all of the sexual activity you did 
with a 40-something-year-old.”  (Tr., p. 489, Ls. 12-21.)  By this thought 
experiment the prosecutor was “suggesting” C.F., who was in those 
circumstances, might “hold some things back” or “not acknowledge” some of the 
sexual activities.  (Tr., p. 489, L. 22 – p. 490, L. 2.) 
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 The prosecutor’s argument to “imagine” a person in the victim’s 
circumstances undergoing a forensic sex abuse interview was a proper argument  
to consider the victim’s credibility in light of his circumstances.  Nelson’s claim 
that it constituted fundamental error is without merit.1 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment for sexual 
battery on a child age 16 or 17.  
 DATED this 19th day of January, 2016. 
 
 
 
      /s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen____________ 
      KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
      Deputy Attorney General 
 
                                            
1 The jury acquitted on the lewd conduct charge and convicted only on the sexual 
battery charge.  (R., p. 103.)  Because the evidence showed Nelson confessed to 
the act underlying the lewd conduct charge (performing oral sex on C.F. when 
trimming his pubic hair), it appears that the jury’s verdict could not have been 
influenced by the prosecutor’s argument regarding whether the victim’s testimony 
regarding other incidents of sexual contact was inconsistent with prior 
statements.  Nelson has therefore failed to establish prejudice regarding this 
claim of fundamental error even if he could establish clear constitutional error. 
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